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emphasises those macro variables that have been identified in the
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 of Argentina, March 1995
I
Introduction
Mr. Cavallo has a point: While Mexico in early 1995
was in deep trouble, ending yet another failed Latin
American episode of exchange rate based stabilization
by moving to a managed float of her currency,
Argentina was not doing too badly even in the face of
the “tequila crisis”. Seven years later, however, Mexico
had been awarded investment-grade sovereign rating
by all leading rating agencies, while Argentina was in
deep disarray and selective default.
This paper deals with how the exchange rate
regimes of two main Latin American economies,
namely Argentina and Mexico, shaped their
macroeconomic performance over the period 1994-
2003.1 As Brazil also constitutes a very relevant
benchmark case, having moved not long ago from a
quasi-fixed regime to a managed floating-cum-inflation
targeting scheme, we will assess how it compares with
Argentina and Mexico in terms of both regimes. Due
to the impossibility of isolating the growth effect of the
exchange rate regime in a comparative country study,
we will emphasize those macro variables that have
been identified in the theoretical and empirical
literature as important channels through which the
choice of exchange rate regime affects economic
performance. Ultimately, we aim to draw lessons for
other Latin American and developing countries on how
these channels may drive sustained growth in the
context of a given exchange rate regime.
Section II gives an overview of the current debate
on exchange rate regimes, focusing in particular on the
channels linking exchange rate regimes and economic
performance. Section III briefly describes the three
monetary and exchange rate regimes implemented in
the three countries in 1994-2003.2 Section IV then
analyzes the empirical evidence on the transmission
channels: i) investment, ii) integration of the tradeables
sector into world trade, iii) the mix of capital inflows
and iv) fiscal rigidities and public debt sustainability.
Finally, section V presents the conclusions.
In a nutshell, we argue that 1998 can be
considered as the “breakeven” year when Mexico’s
managed floating currency regime started to yield a
higher payoff relative to Argentina’s currency board
in the face of successive external shocks —notably the
Russian default and Brazil’s currency devaluation. The
net benefits reported by the recent Brazilian managed
float seem more ambiguous, as there was only four
years’ experience of this at the time of writing this
paper. This ambiguity notwithstanding, our analysis
suggests that a more open and domestically integrated
economy, strengthened public finances, and a dynamic
non-traditional export sector, with incentives to allocate
FDI mainly to tradeables, can together make the
difference in building a road to solvency and sustained
growth.
2
 See footnote 1 above.
  This study was carried out as part of the ECLAC research project
on Management of Volatility, Financial Globalization and Growth
in Emerging Economies, supported by the Ford Foundation. At the
time, Martín Grandes was a consultant of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The authors
gratefully acknowledge the contribution by Rogerio Studart to the
parts covering Brazil, and comments by Ricardo Ffrench-Davis,
Daniel Heymann, John Williamson and other participants in two
seminars organized by ECLAC in 2002 and 2003 in Santiago. The
opinions expressed here are the responsibility of the authors, and
may not coincide with those of the OECD or ECLAC.
1
 Although 2002 and 2003 are within the sample period, we will as
a rule not refer to the Argentine case over those years. In early
2002, Argentina shifted to a flexible exchange rate regime, after
abandoning its previous “convertibility regime” (1991-2001), which
in general terms was comparable with the fixed exchange rate
regimes known as currency board regimes. Due to the shortness of
the sample and Argentina’s “disorderly” exit from the currency board
regime, however (partial default on domestic and external
obligations, deposit freeze, a real slump in the economy and political
uncertainty), we feel that we do not have sufficient unbiased
information to assess macroeconomic performance under the new
floating regime against either the currency board (1991-2001) or
the regimes adopted by Brazil and Mexico.
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II
Exchange rate regimes and
macroeconomic performance
For a while, there was a doctrine —or rather a
consensus— holding that either a full float or a hard
peg (“dollarization” or monetary unions) was the best
exchange rate policy to adopt, and this influenced much
of the new literature about currency regimes. This
consensus was largely driven by Mundell’s “impossible
trinity” theorem, in view of increasing world financial
integration and full capital account liberalization in
most emerging economies (EEs).
On the one hand, the hard peg advocates have
argued that independent monetary policy is no longer
an effective policy instrument for EEs for a variety of
reasons: i) the lack of credibility; ii) the dollarization
of liabilities (Calvo, 2000; Hausmann and Powell,
1999) and the “original sin” problem, i.e., the inability
to borrow long-term in local currency, which induces
currency and maturity mismatches (Hausmann, 2000);3
iii) excessive de facto interest rate and reserves
volatility, resulting in “fear of floating” (Calvo and
Reinhart, 2002), or iv) the substitution of relative price
adjustment by capital market financing (Dornbusch,
2001). They have also ruled out intermediate options
due to their non-verifiability (Frankel, Schmukler and
Serven, 2001), their loss of prestige (Guidotti, Escude
and Powell, 2000) or the assumption of ineffectiveness
of capital controls. Thus, importing credibility by
anchoring it on a key currency such as the US dollar
has been held by the hard peg advocates to be the most
suitable move for EEs in order to cope with their global
exposure and vulnerability to “sudden stops” of capital
flows.
On the other hand, those who support exchange
rate flexibility (e.g. Larraín and Velasco, 2001;
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2000), have pointed to nominal wage
and price rigidities, to the prevalence of real shocks in
EEs, and to the moral hazards implicit in exchange rate
pegs to make their case. They have sought to prove
their case by citing the main shortcomings of hard peg
experiences such as wider and more volatile sovereign
spreads driven by comparatively growing default risk;
heightened output volatility; wage and price stickiness;
insufficient fiscal discipline, and non-compliance with
other criteria laid down in Optimum Currency Area (OCA)
theory to irrevocably peg the exchange rate. Furthermore,
revived intermediate options and credibility-building
approaches have also been brought back into the arena
(e.g. Williamson, 2000; Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré,
2000; Braga de Macedo, Cohen and Reisen, 2001) to
emphasize that different transition paths can be
adopted in EEs, without necessarily contradicting the
basic tenets of the impossible trinity theorem.
In contrast with this perennial more general debate
about the superiority of exchange rate regimes in
defined circumstances, theory and evidence on the
channels through which such regimes impact growth
performance is relatively sparse. This may be due to
the fact that the policy relevance of mainstream
economics has been hampered by its rational
expectations framework, where perfect-foresight
models suggest that exchange rate regimes should not
affect the long-run equilibrium value of real variables,
including long-run resource allocation. Let us therefore
direct our attention to proxy variables relevant to this
comparative study, which have provided evidence of
a link between the exchange rate regime and economic
growth in theory and practice (figure 1).
First, the strong correlation between investment
and growth resulting from the interaction of capital
accumulation and technical progress is well established
(e.g. Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven and Solimano, 1996).
Further, the debt-cycle hypothesis warns that capital-
importing countries are bound to run into costly crises
unless capital inflows consistently augment investment
rather than being diverted into consumption (Ffrench-
Davis and Reisen, 1998). What is the evidence, then,
that exchange rate regimes impact on investment versus
consumption decisions?
3
 In the 1990s, the opening of the capital account and financial
liberalization, in many Latin American economies led to rapid
growth of external liabilities and currency mismatches. Both trends
increased the vulnerability of these economies to external shocks
—whether determined by loss of investment confidence in a specific
country or due to contagion. Since, in a context of high vulnerability,
improving investment confidence is often sought by increasing
interest rates and/or augmenting fiscal surplus, both policies have
strong recessive effects on economic activity.
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Exchange rate pegs have often been accompanied
by a boom in bank lending, which in turn has fuelled
a boom in consumption spending (Sachs, Tornell and
Velasco, 1996). Initially, pegs tend to lower inflation,
which in turn produces a rise in real-money balances,
both as a result of central bank intervention to peg the
currency and of higher money demand. The
unsterilized intervention on the foreign exchange
market is fully intermediated into the banking system,
giving rise to a twin bank credit and spending boom.
Under flexible exchange rates, in contrast, disinflation
results from a lower money supply and exchange rate
appreciation. Intermediate exchange rate regimes are
characterized by sterilized intervention which aims at
reducing the domestic credit component in response to
higher foreign exchange reserves. In a context of
capital inflows, disinflation and ill-supervised banking
systems, therefore, pegs will tilt the allocation of
resources more to consumption than will either floating
or intermediate regimes.
Second, the endogenous-growth literature has
established a positive link between openness to
international trade and economic growth, as open
economies benefit from their greater ability to absorb
technological advances, take advantage of larger
markets and boost efficiency as a result of higher
competition (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).4 Which
kind of exchange rate regime is more likely to foster
international trade orientation will probably largely
depend on the extent to which flexible rates can avoid
excessive volatility and pegs can prevent large
misalignments of the real effective exchange rate. Rose
(2000) finds evidence that currency unions —i.e.,
countries that share the same currency— have a
positive effect on trade, while exchange rate volatility
exerts a negative influence; this result implies,
however, that unlike the case of Argentina, the bulk
of trade is within the union, as otherwise effective
exchange rates can be destabilized by third-currency
fluctuations. Pegged rates, in contrast, may be more
akin to persistent misalignments and hence less
supportive to export growth. Nilsson and Nilsson
(2000), using a gravity model for more than 100
countries, find that more flexible regimes favour export
growth and, by implication, GDP growth.5
Third, although the link between international
trade and growth has received more attention in the
literature, openness to capital flows can also promote
growth, under certain conditions. The structure of
capital inflows which the opening process entails will
determine its growth impact, as equity and foreign
direct investment (FDI) inflows appear to have had a
strong impact on growth in developing countries during
the 1990s (Reisen and Soto, 2001).6 Bonds, in contrast,
did not produce any significant impact on growth,
while foreign bank lending —both short and long
term— was negatively associated with future per capita
income growth in the recipient country, unless local
banks were sufficiently capitalized. As reported in
Ffrench-Davis and Reisen (1998), pegs in developing
countries have repeatedly induced hot money inflows
in view of structural interest rate differentials that were
exploited by local banks and other intermediaries.
Exchange rate pegs provide an incentive to allocate
those inflows disregarding currency and maturity risks,
as these are implicitly transferred to the central bank.
Flexible exchange rates are thus more likely than pegs
FIGURE 1
Four channels between exchange rate
regime and growth
Source: Prepared by the authors.
the opening is driven by either exports or imports, on the
specialization pattern of the economy which is opening up, on its
main trading partners, on the efforts to complete markets, and on
other related reasons (see Bouzas and Keifman, 2003; Rodrik, 2001).
5
 The authors follow a six-way classification ranging from single
currency pegging to independent floating.
6
 It cannot be excluded that the result of a positive growth impact
of equity flows may be based on an incomplete model and may
therefore not be robust. Further, the growth impact obtained may






















 The empirical evidence is not so clear, however. The positive
effect of trade openness on growth will ultimately depend on whether
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to produce inflows that entail growth benefits. However,
an unstable supply of external funding can be
endogenous to the real effective exchange rate, in that
it may cause, for example, real misalignment or excess
volatility of this variable, thus dampening any positive
growth effect from “more benign” capital inflows.
Fourth, the degree of a country’s fiscal,
institutional, price and wage rigidity, as well as its
specific shock exposure, will determine to an important
extent the impact of the exchange rate regime on long-
run economic performance (Freytag, 2002). In the
presence of rigidities (not every economy displays
Hong Kong’s flexibility), more flexible exchange rate
arrangements may foster growth because real shocks
can be absorbed more easily, as monetary policy retains
a degree of autonomy for an anti-cyclical stance, and
costly breakdowns of the exchange rate regime in
adverse conditions are less likely than under pegs. In
particular, the way fiscal discipline shapes the
perception on public debt sustainability may
endogenously drive interest rates (sovereign spreads)
and real output growth in either sense. Although hard
pegs are supposed to bring about more fiscal discipline,
due to the loss of inflationary finance and its immediate
effect on intertemporal budget constraints, they can
also act in an opposite way if they are accompanied
by a twin credit and consumption boom that ends up
boosting public expenditures (Sachs, Tornell and
Velasco, 1996; Sun, 2003).
The empirical evidence on the growth impact of
exchange rate regimes in developing countries is
inconclusive so far, with a certain bias in favor of
flexible regimes. Adopting a three-way classification
based on de facto regimes, with data taken from the
IMF World Economic Outlook over the 1960-1990
period (IMF, 1960-1990), Ghosh, Gulde and others
(1996) found (weak) evidence on the link between
choice of exchange rate regime and economic growth.
They found that although pegged regimes have been
associated with higher investment, floats have been
accompanied by faster productivity growth when
measured by per capita GDP growth and controlling
for inflation differentials. This result, however, as the
authors acknowledge to some extent, might be much
biased by the inclusion of the 1960s and early 1970s,
when most of the regimes were fixed and inflation was
pretty low everywhere. In fact, when they exclude the
1960s the growth differential in favour of floating
exchange regimes becomes as much as 1.5% higher in
lower income countries. Part of the slightly higher
productivity growth under floating rates is reflected in
faster growth of trade and a better allocation of
resources, given some relative price rigidity (e.g., in
real wages) observed in countries with pegs. One
manifestation of the rigidities corroborated by Ghosh,
Gulde and others (1996) is the higher volatility of GDP
growth and employment, a result recently confirmed
by Ffrench-Davis and Larraín (2003). A last but not
least interesting result presented by Ghosh, Gulde and
others (1996) refers to the output growth gains those
countries obtained by switching from a peg to a more
flexible arrangement. They calculate an average
increase in GDP growth of 0.3 percentage points one
year after the switch and more than 1 percentage point
three years after it.
Challenging conventional IMF classifications based
on de jure regimes, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2001) regroup exchange rate policies by using a K-
cluster methodology that distinguishes high from low
volatility environments. This new classification groups
the countries according to the actual behaviour of three
main variables: i) volatility of the nominal exchange
rate, (ii) volatility of the variations in the nominal
exchange rate and (iii) volatility of reserves, measured
as the absolute average changes in foreign-currency
reserves as a proportion of the monetary base (in order
to assess the monetary impact of the intervention in
currency markets). Using monthly IMF statistics —but
only over the 1974-1999 period, in order to exclude
the Bretton Woods period, when fixed exchange rates
predominated— these authors ran econometric
regressions and found that: i) pegs are significantly and
negatively related with per capita output growth in non-
industrial countries; ii) de jure pegs that devalue exhibit
faster growth than their counterparts that defend the
exchange rate regime; iii) output volatility declines
monotonically with the degree of regime flexibility,
and iv) real interest rates appear to be lower under fixed
exchange rates than under floats, even for those
countries with intermediate regimes, and especially
during the 1990s.7
Finally, based on the regime classification of
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, the Bank of Canada
conducted a study investigating the effect of the
exchange rate regime on medium-term growth (five-
year averages) for a sample of 25 emerging economies
7
 However, this result only holds more strongly when the IMF
classification is used. When the authors look at de facto pegs, they
find that only some short-lasting pegged regimes display lower real
interest rates than in more flexible or intermediate regimes.
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over the 1973-1998 period (Bailliu, Lafrance and
Perrault, 2001). The study finds evidence that more
flexible exchange rate arrangements are associated with
higher growth, provided the countries in question are
open to international capital flows and have well-
developed financial markets.
board was integrated into the Central Bank; there were
no designated currency board accounts. Second, 33%
of the money-base cover could be provided in the form
of dollar short-term debt of the Argentine government,
rather than through international reserves. Third, the
Argentine system was characterized by demanding
capital requirements and a series of liquidity
provisions. Banks were obliged to hold 21% of all
deposits in liquid international reserves at the Central
Bank or at Deutsche Bank New York. The Central
Bank also had a contingent line of credit with a dozen
international banks, covering 10% of deposits in the
banking system.
2. Mexico: from quasi-peg to inflation-targeting
After the collapse of its pegged but adjustable exchange
rate regime, late in 1994, Mexico has been floating
quite freely. Nevertheless, at different stages the
authorities have had to intervene in the foreign
exchange market for different reasons. This has meant
less exchange rate volatility on the one hand, and more
reserves and interest rate volatility on the other, which
is not generally observed in pure floating regimes (see
Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, among others). Hence, this
regime very much resembles a managed float. In all
of the cases of intervention, the rule that has always
been followed has consisted of complete transparency
of the intervention, which has not been designed to
defend a particular level of the exchange rate (Carstens
and Werner, 1999). The rule has included a two-fold
approach in which a put-option mechanism was used
to accumulate reserves and a contingent sale was
generally used when the Central Bank wanted to
minimize a sudden depreciation. Additionally, the
Banco de México sterilizes foreign capital inflows
III
Hard pegs, soft floats: the bases of the
Argentine, Brazilian and Mexican exchange
rate regimes
1. Argentina’s “Currency Board” regime (R.I.P.)
Currency boards, once designed as a monetary
arrangement for British colonies and then disused as
countries gained political independence, have been
back in fashion recently. Currency boards now exist
in Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hong Kong and
Lithuania, but also existed in Argentina until January
2002.8 They consist of exchange rates which are strictly
fixed, not just by policy but by law. Domestic money
can only be issued when it is fully backed by foreign
exchange, removing monetary policy discretion from
the government and the central bank.
Argentina provided one of the most-debated cases
of a currency board regime. In April 1991, after a long
history of macroeconomic mismanagement and two
episodes of hyperinflation, the currency board —called
a “convertibility regime” in that country— started to
operate, with the peso pegged to the US dollar at par.
The regime was based on the Convertibility Act passed
in March 1991 by Congress, which granted the dollar
legal tender status and was subsequently supported by
comprehensive deregulation of the economy and full
liberalization of the current and capital accounts of the
balance of payments.
Argentina’s foreign exchange regime featured
some notable design elements that represent a deviation
from a strict currency board. These elements were
introduced to accommodate to the loss of a lender of
last resort which a currency board entails and which
exposes the country to financial crises with insufficient
provision of liquidity; this in turn requires strong and
liquid domestic banks. In Argentina, first the currency
8
 See footnote 1.
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through open-market interventions in order not to affect
the primary money supply. Futures currency markets
have also been created in order to reduce exchange rate
volatility.
While Mexico adopted managed floating, it was
gradually converging towards inflation targeting to
anchor inflation expectations. Just after the “tequila
crisis”, there was a brief experience with monetary
targeting, but as inflation came down and there was
significant evidence of instability in the demand for
money, the Central Bank started adopting annual
inflation targets (since 1997/1998, according to some
important officials). The main elements of the current
framework include i) the attainment of the medium-
term goal of reducing inflation towards international
levels in 2003; ii) annual inflation targets; iii)
monetary policy actions based on an assessment of
inflationary pressures, and iv) a transparent system
based on the publication of a quarterly inflation report.
A basic difference of the Mexican approach, compared
to other “targeters”, concerns the policy instrument.
While most inflation targeters use a short-term interest
rate target (as in Brazil, for example), the Mexican
Central Bank uses a special operating procedure,
known as “el corto”, for achieving the desired level
of reserves. This system induces significant volatility
in short-term nominal interest rates, a feature desired
by the authorities in order to have a more stable
exchange rate and, hence, a more stable inflationary
environment.
3. Brazil’s exchange rate regimes. From the Plan
Real to the January 1999 shift to flexibility
In 1994, Brazil also adopted an exchange rate-based
regime after a long period of high inflation. The Plan
Real was a four-stage program, including: i) fiscal
adjustment, in order to reduce demand pressure as the
economy was stabilized; ii) the introduction of a super-
indexation mechanism, meant to create a stable set of
relative prices using the Real Value Index (URV) as a
unit of account; iii) a monetary reform which replaced
the cruzeiro, the old currency, with the Real –thus
turning the URV into the unit of account, and iv) the
administration of stability, which required the
avoidance of strong disequilibria between aggregate
demand and supply.
Although the Plan Real was initially intended to
have a monetary anchor, the subsequent increase in the
demand for money was far beyond the level initially
planned, leading the government to abandon the
monetary targets.9 By November 1994, the monetary
authorities officially gave up the monetary anchor and
allowed the exchange rate to revalue. Since capital and
trade account liberalization had already been
introduced in the early 1990s, and the reserves
accumulated between 1992 and 1994 were significant,
the transition from a monetary to exchange rate-based
anchor was greatly facilitated by the exceptional
liquidity in the international financial markets until
1997.
The Plan Real was successful in several aspects.
Inflation declined dramatically in the first two months
of the Plan, and stabilized at less than one-digit rates
thereafter. Domestic consumption and growth were
boosted due to the real-income gains and the rapid
process of monetization, which together stimulated the
expansion of short-term credit and increasing trade
deficits. External vulnerability increased with the
buildup of external debt, while domestic financial
vulnerability was associated with the increase in public
debt, particularly of the central government.10
From mid-1998, Brazil started facing a continued
attack on its exchange rate regime, which led to a
sustained depletion of the international reserves. This
attack intensified after the re-election of Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, in November 1998, and culminated
in the abandonment of the semi-fixed exchange rate
and the adoption of a managed floating regime in
January 1999.11 After significant over-devaluation of
the Real, from mid-1999 the pressures began to
subside, the investment climate became more
optimistic, and economic activity showed signs of
recovery in 2000. Only in early 2002 did the pressure
on the Real resume; thus, the move towards a managed
floating exchange rate has so far been considered by
most analysts a successful move.
9
 The government had already imposed significant reserve
requirements for the banks, which implied high interest rates.
10
 This increase had to do with several factors, but two of them are
of particular importance. First, the central government refinanced
and consolidated the debt of the states, as part of a plan to restructure
their financial systems. Second, the borrowing interest rate was
maintained at very high levels.
11
 We view this regime as a managed float because frequent short-
term interest rate hikes are observable (in a pure floating regime
there should be no interest rate volatility), and because, as in the
case of Mexico, there has been limited variability in the exchange
rate (whereas the exchange rate should be the only shock absorber
mechanism in a pure float). In addition, in Brazil the inflation target
rule followed by the central bank implies an indirect target of the
nominal exchange rate, in the light of some degree of pass-through
from the latter to domestic prices.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 6  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 5
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL
AND MEXICO • MARTÍN GRANDES AND HELMUT REISEN
14
IV
Exchange rate regime and macroeconomic
performance: the channels of transmission
This section analyses the channels of transmission
between the exchange rate regime and economic
performance (growth) for the three Latin American
countries considered in this paper (Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico). We ultimately seek to explain how
Mexico’s managed float has built credibility through
a sound and less volatile economic performance,
whereas Argentina’s currency board has failed to
deliver the long-term benefits it was supposed to
produce. Unlike Argentina, Mexico’s managed float
has allowed a smooth response to external shocks. As
for Brazil, it seems early to conclude that the managed
floating regime has delivered a better overall
macroeconomic performance. Some improvement in
fiscal and monetary management, a trend consolidation
of FDI flows on top of other capital flows, and the
avoidance of large real exchange rate misalignments
after 1999 (compared to the real exchange rate
fluctuations over the period of the quasi-fixed regime,
i.e. 1994-1998) stand out nonetheless as positive and
promising elements of this policy regime.
1. Real GDP and investment growth
In the post-tequila crisis period (1996-2003), the
Mexican growth rate was nearly four times as large as
that of Argentina (3.67% against 0.86%, and 4.5%
against 1.5% if we consider the sub-period up to 2001),
and nearly twice as large as that of Brazil; however,
GDP growth figures do not show such a disparity over
1994-2003 (our reference period): 0.98%, 2.5% and
2.76% in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, respectively.
Nor are there sizeable differences when GDP growth is
measured over 1994-2001: 1.5%, 2.9% and 3%. Figure 2
shows the higher output volatility in Argentina
compared to Mexico and Brazil, turning from a peak
of 8.1% in 1997 to a –4.4% downturn in 2001. It is
worth noting that Mexico’s real output slump in 2001
is fundamentally attributable to the United States
recession (just as the 2000 boom was due to the
expansionary cycle in that country). So far, we might
be tempted to conclude that the more flexible exchange
rate regime in Brazil has not paid off, since annual
growth rates remained at roughly the same levels
recorded prior to the flotation of the real. However,
once we take into account the shorter sample period
—in relation to Mexico’s managed float—, the political
uncertainties surrounding the presidential election in
2002 and the global financial turmoil all emerging
economies were facing at that time (1998-2002), it
seems more reasonable that Brazil was not able to
increase its average growth rates.
Mexico’s relatively better performance can be
explained by two factors: gross domestic investment
which was more dynamic and less dependent on
foreign savings, and the increasing share of fast-
growing exports in GDP (table 1), partly driven by the
maquila industry, which accounted for between 40 and
48 % of total real exports in the period in question.
Brazil, however, was not able to raise its output growth
in spite of a more robust export performance in 1999-
2003 compared to 1994-1998, and despite having
stabilized its current account deficits.
The paradox of the Argentine situation lay in the
continued boosting of exports required to lessen the
dependence on external savings to finance gross
domestic investment (GDI), while this dependence
increased during the last years of the currency board and
GDI plummeted to its lowest level since 1993 (15.6%
of GDP in 2001). Figure 3 shows GDI and national
savings (NS) as a proportion of GDP in the three
countries during 1994-2003 and three sub-periods. The
figures reveal a crude polarity: on the one hand,
decreasing GDI as a proportion of GDP (back to the levels
of the 1995 slump) with increasing reliance on foreign
savings in Argentina; in Mexico, in contrast, we see a
rising share of GDI together with lower and stabilized
shares of foreign saving. Brazil displays an
intermediate path, with investment and saving rates
quite similar under both regimes.
Summing up, our first finding is that Mexico’s
managed float, as compared to Argentina’s hard peg
and both the managed float and quasi-fixed regimes
applied in Brazil, has displayed: higher and less volatile
investment growth rates (see table 1), a higher
investment ratio, less dependency on foreign savings,
and output growth more driven by external demand.
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TABLE 1
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Gross domestic investment
and exports at constant prices, 1994-2003
(Percentages)
Argentina Mexico Brazil
GDI Export Exports GDI Export Maquila Exports GDI Export Exports
growth growth as % of growth growth export as % of growth growth as % of
GDP growth GDP GDP
1994 13.7 15.3 7.5 8.4 17.8 28.2 15.2 14.3 4.0 9.5
1995 –13.1 22.5 9.5 –29.0 30.2 22.9 17.2 7.3 –2.0 7.7
1996 8.9 7.6 9.7 16.4 18.2 23.7 23.9 1.2 0.6 7.0
1997 17.7 12.2 10.0 21.0 10.7 18.0 26.8 9.3 11.2 7.5
1998 6.5 10.6 10.7 10.3 12.1 20.8 27.8 –0.3 3.7 7.4
1999 –12.6 –1.3 10.9 7.7 12.4 19.5 29.7 –7.2 9.2 10.3
2000 –6.8 2.7 11.3 11.4 16.4 23.2 32.2 4.5 10.6 10.7
2001 –15.7 2.7 12.2 –5.6 –3.8 –5.4 35.2 1.1 11.2 13.2
2002 –36.4 3.1 14.1 –0.6 1.6 2.6 33.9 –4.2 7.9 15.5
2003 38.2 6.0 13.7 0.4 2.7 2.2 34.1 –5.1 9.0 16.4
1994-2003
   Mean 0.03 8.15 10.97 4.03 11.84 15.57 27.60 2.07 6.54 10.52
   Std. dev. 21.15 7.13 1.98 14.09 9.83 11.40 6.99 6.82 4.69 3.44
1996-2003
   Mean –0.03 5.46 11.58 7.61 8.80 13.08 30.45 –0.10 7.93 10.99
   Std. dev. 22.90 4.51 1.62 9.06 7.77 11.39 4.03 5.42 3.82 3.70
Source: Data base of the Ministry of the Economy of Argentina [http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco.html]; Central Bank
of Brazil (various years); IMF (2004); National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics of Mexico (INEGI), Banco de Información
Económica [http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe]; ECLAC (1994-2004).
FIGURE 2
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Annual real GDP growth rates, 1994-2003
(Percentages)
Source: Data base of the Ministry of the Economy of Argentina [http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco.html]; Aggregate
data base of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) [http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/]; National Institute of Statistics,
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FIGURE 3
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Gross domestic investment
and national savings,a various sub-periods
(As a percentage of GDP)
Source: ECLAC (various years).
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2. Trade openness
Undoubtedly, the process of trade and financial
liberalization undertaken by Mexico (in the mid-1980s,
when it became a member of GATT), and Argentina and
Brazil (in the early 1990s), together with the structural
reforms carried out so far, has brought about increasing
trade and FDI flows. The enlargement of domestic and
sub-regional markets has been a common feature of
that process, at least in its first stages. Such a boom in
trade and investment was prompted by a number of
factors: i) preferential agreements (NAFTA, MERCOSUR);
ii) vigorous economic growth of natural partners (e.g.,
the United States in the case of Mexico); iii)
consumption booms triggered by lower inflation and
exchange rate appreciation, and iv) confident foreign
investors seeking to diversify portfolios in their quest
for high returns. The relative quantity, quality and
breakdown of these flows have not always been
similar, however.
A first distinctive feature has been the degree of
openness of those economies (figure 4). In other words,
the speed with which trade flows grew with respect to
current GDP marks an important difference in the degree
of integration of each country into world trade.
Mexico’s trade (exports and imports in nominal US
dollars) grew at least fourfold during the 1990s, and
its imports grew at a fairly similar pace to exports. In
contrast, Argentina and Brazil remained relatively
closed economies. Argentina’s degree of openness rose
from about 15% of GDP in 1993 to nearly 25% GDP in
1997, subsequently fluctuating around 20% until 2002,
when it almost doubled as a result of the devaluation
of the peso —which reduces the denominator and
increases the numerator— and the collapse of real GDP.
As for Brazil, its degree of openness had fluctuated
between 15% and 20% in 1993-1998 (the quasi-pegged
regime period), and the average only rose (from about
20% to nearly 30%) after the devaluation of the Real
in early 1999.12
12
 A more accurate indicator of trade openness could be the share of
internationally tradeable goods in the consumer price index, or net
exports or imports as a percentage of aggregate supply or demand.
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While Mexico has increased its trade exposure,
Argentina’s trade integration has barely developed over
the 1990s (see figure 4). On the export side, the
outcome is very clear: Argentine exports only reached
a 12.2% share of real GDP in 2001, showing that foreign
markets made only a modest contribution to overall
growth, whereas about a third of the real demand for
Mexican goods and services is accounted for by a fairly
dynamic export sector. It is worth noting that (although
compared to a lower benchmark) Argentine real
exports had grown faster than GDP until 1998, they
never caught up with the Mexican export growth rate,
as may be seen from table 1 above. As for Brazil, a
marked upward trend in export growth was observed
in 1999-2003, with average annual growth rates of
10%, well above those recorded in 1994-1998.
Figure 4 indeed hints at an exponential growth of
Mexican trade flows (in nominal US dollars). Although
the 1995 jump can be partly explained by the peso
devaluation (as is the case in Brazil in 1999 and
Argentina in 2002), because it reduces the denominator
—GDP— proportionally, the subsequent real
appreciation along with ever-increasing trade flows
casts some doubt on the role of the exchange rate as
the main trigger of this “big push”. Rather than
exchange rate elasticity or permanent terms-of-trade
effects, the better performance of Mexico’s trade
integration may have to do with the benefits associated
with NAFTA and, in particular, with the privilege of
having metaphorically travelled in a first-class carriage
pulled by a US engine growing at a yearly 3% until
2000.
This was not without becoming extremely US-
dependent on the export side (nearly 90% of exports
went to the United States market), which may partly
explain the big slowdown in real growth in 2001 as the
US recession deepened. However, Mexico was already
considerably dependent on the United States at the
beginning of the 1990s, when exports to that country
accounted for around 80% of its total foreign sales.
A noteworthy pillar of the impressive Mexican
trade performance is the shift in the country’s
specialization pattern. Oil-based exports, either
manufactured (the major part) or at the extraction level
FIGURE 4
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: A measure of the degree
of trade opennessa
(Percentages)
Source: Database of the Ministry of the Economy of Argentina [http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco.html]; Central Bank
of Brazil (various years); IMF (2004); economic information data bank of the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics of
Mexico (INEGI) [http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe].
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(including gas and derivatives), dropped to 8% of total
exports in 2001 compared to 68% in 1985. This is not
due to a negative shock to the terms of trade (as we
will see below) but to a change in export composition
towards non-traditional exports, making Mexico less
dependent on raw materials price fluctuations.
A second important aspect related to the trade
integration channel deals with price-competitiveness
factors affecting the external balances and domestic
resource reallocation. Under normal circumstances, a
stable and competitive real effective exchange rate
(REER) is key to the development of an outward-
oriented tradeable sector, to the ability to reap the gains
from trade dynamics, and ultimately to the achievement
of sustained growth. Here, we analyze the evolution of
REERs, the terms of trade and the path of unit labour
cost in the three economies.
After the over-adjustment of the nominal
exchange rate in the aftermath of the currency crisis,
the Mexican REER gradually moved, by 2003, to an
even higher level than in 1994 (before the crisis)
(figure 5).
Does this move mean that an equilibrium level of
appreciation has been reached? There are many
qualitative and quantitative reasons for differentiation
between the REER values in a recent year (2003) and
an earlier moment (1994):
i) A managed floating regime —along with an
inflation-targeting rule— allows some flexibility
to face external shocks; in contrast, the previous
non-credible peg collapsed amid a currency and
banking crisis.
ii) Lessened dependency on foreign savings in 2003
has stabilized current account deficits, so that
capital flow reversals are less damaging for the
real economy. Moreover, the current account is
more solidly financed than it was in 1994, as FDI
flows form the highest share of total capital
inflows and are chiefly addressed to tradeable
sectors.
FIGURE 5
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Real effective exchange ratesa
and terms of trade index, 1990-2003
(REER: 1993=100); TT index: 1993=100)b
Source: JP Morgan; Database of the Ministry of the Economy of Argentina [http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco.html];
Aggregate data base of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) [http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/];economic information data
bank of the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics of Mexico (INEGI) [http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe].
a A fall in the real effective exchange rate (REER) means real effective depreciation/devaluation.
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iii) The export mix in 2003 includes a higher share
of tradeable manufacturing products.
iv) Important sectoral productivity gains have been
reflected in lower average unit labour costs than
those of the United States (figure 6).13
Thus, a positive productivity gap between
tradeable and non-tradeable goods (the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, see Baldi and Mulder, 2002), lower
relative unit labour costs vis a vis the United States,
and a lower, stabilized current account deficit may give
a rational explanation for equilibrium real exchange
rate appreciation. Even so, this is a debatable issue.
It is worthwhile noting that in Argentina the real
effective exchange rate appreciation coincided with a
rise in industrial productivity, as unit labour costs
declined more than 30% in dollar terms during 1993-
1998. Notwithstanding, the shrinking share of
manufacturing GDP (16% in 2000), as well as the
modest contribution of industrial exports (near 4% of
GDP), lead to the conclusion that higher productivity had
13
 Unfortunately, the time series of dollar unit labour cost in the
manufacturing sector has been discontinued in Argentina and is not
available over the whole period in the case of Brazil.
been insufficient to offset the real appreciation.
Moreover, terms of trade fluctuations —roughly similar
to those of Mexico but different from those of Brazil—
were not cushioned by some degree of exchange rate
flexibility and only served to exacerbate external
imbalances.
To sum up, our second finding is that Mexico’s
managed float has bolstered higher relative openness,
a more diversified export mix (including higher value-
added products), and an exponential increase in exports
(mainly driven by United States growth and NAFTA).
Although Brazil is still a relatively closed economy,
there is some indication that its managed float regime
might favour similar outcomes in the long run.14 With
respect to the REER appreciation, we view the
appreciation of the Mexican peso up to 2003 as an
equilibrium appreciation because of: i) Mexico’s higher
relative productivity (with respect to that of the United
States), explained by lower unit labour costs; ii) an
increase in the share of tradeable manufacturing goods
FIGURE 6
United States and Mexico: Manufacturing unit
labour cost, 1993-2003
(1993=100)
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14
 The openness ratio in Argentina doubled in early 2002 mainly as
a result of the peso devaluation, but it still remains an open question
whether this higher ratio is sustainable in the long-run.
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in its exports; and iii) more flexibility to cushion
external shocks.
3. Capital flows
While Argentina defaulted on its external obligations,
and its currency board collapsed in early 2002,
Mexico has been enjoying the benefits of the
investment grade status supported by NAFTA
preferential agreements and OECD membership since
1994. Brazil, too, has fared better than Argentina. A
preliminary conclusion which may be drawn from this
story is that after the Russian default, markets have
been screening more thoroughly the wide spectrum
of emerging markets, as shown by the differential
sovereign spreads measured by the JP Morgan EMBI+
(emerging markets bond index) and EMBI Global
indexes after 1998 (figure 7).
Another major issue related to the global capital
market and borrowers’ credibility concerns the role of
rating agencies in assessing sovereign borrower
creditworthiness. Although credit rating downgrades
and upgrades seem to lag behind and validate market
perceptions, and of course do not move as rapidly as
spreads do, they reflect the same pattern as the latter
(see figure 7). Actually, the empirical evidence so far
has revealed that they tend to move pro-cyclically,
particularly when moving downward. Nevertheless,
announcements over possible upgrades/downgrades
appear to have some bearing on bond spreads (Reisen,
2003). Moreover, as most institutional investors’
placements are constrained by prudential regulation
standards, a downgrade towards the speculative notch
can modify the demand for a determined sovereign
asset class, thus making it more risky and volatile in
the eyes of the market.
Rating actions are chiefly based on the sovereign
debtor’s ability and willingness to pay. That depends
in turn on the extent to which solvency and liquidity
problems are incorporated into the market’s or
agencies’ assessments about the prospects of the
sovereign borrower’s performance. Therefore, part of
the input into sovereign risk perceptions or ratings
relies on indicators which mainly deal with external
payments and debt, fiscal stance or monetary and
liquidity issues (see, for example, Moody’s, 2001).
Even though they are necessarily backward looking,
the delay in producing and releasing information or
FIGURE 7
Argentina and Brazil: EMBI+a spreads relative to Mexico, 1994-2003
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from JP Morgan.
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errors of forecasting (not uncommon in volatile,
unpredictable markets) makes them relevant for current
assessments.
Accordingly, exchange rate policy is important
because it has much to do with the way the economies
accommodate a shock or cope with financial turmoil
in order to put themselves back on the solvency track
or avoid liquidity crunches. From this standpoint, we
argue that the managed floating regime has seemed to
pay off in Mexico since the aftermath of the East Asian
crisis and the onset of the Russian default. In contrast,
the ineffectiveness of the Argentine currency board and
the inappropriate policies pursued to resume economic
growth in 1999-2001 or to try to smooth out external
shocks did cast additional doubt on the sustainability
of the economic regime, pushing default and currency
risk up to unprecedented levels.
Figure 8 shows the ratings assigned by the two
main rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and
Moody’s) for the period from 1996 to 2003. We have
transformed both scales into numerical equivalents,
assigning a number not only to each risk category (for
example, AAA) but also to each concept used in the
category (e.g., BB positive=16, BB stable=15, BB
negative=14). From the figure in question we see once
again how the process of divergence only started since
the Russian default.
As explained in section III, the composition and
volatility of capital inflows is a well established
channel through which exchange rate regimes impact
on growth. Two major facts stand out in this respect:
First, the breakdown of gross capital inflows over
the period shows substantial differences across
countries and regimes (figures 9, 10 and 11). These
FIGURE 8










































































































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Moody’s Investors Service (www.moodys.com) and Standard and Poor’s
(www.standardandpoors.com).
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Source: IMF (2004), CD ROM version.
FIGURE 9
Mexico: Gross capital inflows,
1995-2003
(Percentages)
Source: IMF (2004), CD ROM version.
FIGURE 10
Argentina: Gross capital inflows, 1993-2001
(Percentages)
Source: IMF (2004), CD ROM version.
FIGURE 11
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figures clearly show that Mexico has received more
finance through FDI flows, as also has Brazil after 1998.
In contrast, Argentina depended heavily on short-term
flows (or official flows when those were absent) to
finance its current account deficits. A high share of FDI
in capital inflows reinforces the link between
investment and growth, instead of fuelling a perverse
debt-cycle (as in the case of Argentina’s currency
board, or Mexico’s peg before 1995).
Second, Brazil has been the biggest recipient of
FDI flows (except in 1999, 2001 and 2003), followed
by Mexico. As well as determining the share of FDI in
total inflows or accumulated flows, it is also crucial
to know to what extent current account deficits were
financed with FDI. This ratio between FDI and the
current account position registers a value of 0.9 in
Mexico, 0.8 in Brazil and 0.9 in Argentina (all based
on 1994-2001 averages.15 In 2002 and 2003 there were
current account deficits in Mexico but surpluses in
Argentina and Brazil (only 2003). On the other hand,
Brazil roughly doubled this ratio between the 1995-
1998 and 1999-2003 periods, when it let the exchange
rate float, though in absolute terms the FDI turnover
remained at similar levels. Finally, Mexican FDI inflows
have been directed more to the production of
internationally tradable goods. While the Mexican
manufacturing sector (including the maquila segment)
absorbed 61% of total FDI receipts over the 1995-1999
period, Argentina’s industrial sector absorbed only
34% of total FDI and Brazil 47%.16
Summing up, our third conclusion is that
Mexico’s managed float has paid higher dividends
since 1997/1998 than Argentina’s hard peg and Brazil’s
quasi-fixed regime before 1999: a fact which was
reflected in the shape of better sovereign ratings and
lower spreads. Although it is not independent of the
effects of NAFTA, Mexico’s managed floating regime
has favoured long-term capital flows, that is to say, FDI
mainly directed towards tradeables production (which
represents sustainable backing for current account
deficits). These capital inflows have also been less
volatile.
4. Fiscal and institutional rigidities
Here we explore how the need to finance fiscal
imbalances and outstanding debt repayment has shaped
each solvency profile. An economy becomes insolvent
if the discounted flow of expected net revenues is lower
than the outstanding debt. By bringing about more
sustainable debt dynamics —i.e., stabilized and
relatively low debt to GDP (or to exports) ratios—
countries can influence the perceptions on sovereign
risk, interest rates and, in consequence, real GDP.
Therefore, one should look carefully at indicators such
as debt to GDP or debt to exports of goods and services
ratios and the primary and total fiscal balances as a
percentage of GDP (table 2).
Table 2 shows that both Mexico and Brazil
improved their public finance stances (the former more
impressively) by 2001, while Argentina’s fiscal
imbalances were never corrected and kept worsening
until 2002. Although Brazil has been able to generate
increasing primary surpluses, its external debt to GDP
ratio has continued to rise. This is, however,
attributable to an increase in private sector indebtedness
over the 1997-2001 period. In the case of Mexico, both
the debt to GDP and debt to exports ratios have been
steadily falling since 1997.17
The perception of a link between a peg and fiscal
discipline is intuitive: pegging the exchange rate may
reduce the revenue from money creation (inflation tax),
so in some circumstances a decision to peg may require
a fiscal adjustment to ensure sustainability. Indeed, if
money creation can be replaced with public debt issues
(assuming finance is available from capital markets),
governments could thus smooth their spending so as
to lower the need for budget adjustment. When capital
markets shrink and real output comes down in order
to compensate for other rigidities in face of a shock,
however, fiscal “indiscipline” can pave the way to
insolvency, as seems to have been the case in
Argentina in 2001. Furthermore, some authors (Sachs,
Tornell and Velasco, 1996; Sun, 2003) have argued
that pegs may actually lead to less fiscal discipline, if
combined with disinflation and if a dual boom in credit
and consumption results in higher government
expenditures (generally on non-tradeables), as we saw
in section II.
15
 Argentina’s coefficient falls if windfall FDI flows in 1998 and
1999 are excluded (privatization of public utilities and the formerly
State-owned oil producer YPF).
16
 See Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC, various years). According to these studies, FDI in services
sectors —notably financial services— has gained considerable
ground, reaching an extraordinary 70% of total FDI inflows during
2001 (as a consequence, this FDI is not directly reflected in gross
capital formation).
17
 A comparison with Argentina in 2002-2003 would not be in order,
as this country defaulted on part of its obligations in early 2002 and
the data are therefore not comparable.
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TABLE 2
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Solvency indicators
(Percentages)
Indicator Year Argentina Brazil Mexico
1994 33 30 32
External debt/GDP 1997 43 25 35
2001 52 42 24
1994 4.43 3.03 1.90
External debt/exports of goods and services 1997 4.05 3.38 1.15
2001 4.53 3.11 0.88
1994 1.11 0.27 2.43
Primary fiscal surplus/GDP 1997 0.50 –1.02 3.51
2001 0.54 3.68 2.58
1994 –0.40 0.39 –0.03
Fiscal deficit (operational)/GDP 1997 –1.56 –0.65 –1.07
2001 –3.27 –0.98 –0.72
Source: Database of the Ministry of the Economy of Argentina [http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco.html]; Central Bank
of Brazil (various years); Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of Mexico [http://www.shcp.gob.mx/english/eofp/index.html].
V
Conclusions
Argentina’s dismal performance from the late 1990s
ended in the abolition of its currency board system
introduced in 1991, while Mexico has gradually moved
to restore credibility and has been awarded investment
grade by all major rating agencies. While this
comparative country study can not provide a rigorous
test about the independent role of the exchange rate
regimes that have led to such divergent fortunes, it has
nevertheless confirmed the channels emphasized in the
sparse literature linking the choice of the currency
regime to growth performance.
This paper has highlighted four criteria that will
help to guide the choice of the appropriate currency
regime in emerging-market countries:
— How does the regime impact on the incentive to
invest and save rather than to consume? Does it
foster productivity growth by keeping GDP
volatility in check?
— How does the regime impact on the tradeables
sector and add to its integration into world trade,
namely by providing sustainable and competitive
exchange rate levels and by avoiding
misalignments from the equilibrium rate?
— How does the regime impact on the mix of capital
inflows? Does it encourage flows that carry positive
growth externalities or does it encourage flows that
raise a country’s vulnerability to financial crises?
— How does the regime cope with a country’s given
rigidities (for example, in the fiscal area), and to
what extent can such rigidities safely be assumed
to display a sufficient degree of endogeneity to the
regime choice?
During the last two decades, failed attempts with
hard pegs have been discontinued in favour of more
flexible exchange rate arrangements, as witness Chile
in the early 1980s, Mexico in the mid-1990s, Brazil in
the late 1990s and Argentina since 2002. It is to be
hoped that Argentina will be able to emulate those
fairly successful regime switches and will start to grow
again at sustainable rates.
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Rating histories were taken from Moody’s Investors Service
(www.moodys.com) and Standard and Poor’s
(www.standardandpoors.com). The EMBI + or EMBI Global
indexes and the real effective exchange rates (REER) are from
JP Morgan. Nominal exchange rates, portfolio investment and
FDI flows were taken from International Financial Statistics
(IMF, 2004), CD-ROM version.
Other country data:
— Argentina: external debt stocks (total and non-financial
public sector-central government), fiscal deficit (non-
financial public sector balance), current account,
exports and imports of goods and services, current and
real GDP (base year 1993) and terms of trade index
were taken from the Ministry of the Economy database
at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/
infoeco.html. National savings and investment rates are
from the statistical appendix of the Economic Survey
of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 1993-
2004) .
— Brazil: data on external debt stock (total) and nominal
GDP were taken from the Central Bank’s Boletim do
Banco Central – Relatório mensal at http://
www.bcb.gov.br/?BULLETINCR. Real GDP (base year
1990, average index), and the terms of trade index are
from the Banco de Dados Agregados (aggregate data
bank) of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE), at http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/.
Data on the fiscal deficit (non-financial public sector
balance), the current account, and exports and imports
of goods and services were taken from IMF (2004), CD-
ROM version. National savings and investment rates are
from the statistical appendix of the Economic Survey
of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 1993-
2004) .
— Mexico: data on the external debt stock (total and
public), and non-financial public sector balance
(including privatization revenues, which were not very
important for the period studied) are from the Budget
Planning Office at http://www.shcp.gob.mx/english/
eofp/index.html.18
The data on the current account, exports and imports
of goods and services, terms of trade, current and real GDP
(base year 1993), and manufacturing unit labour costs
(including the comparison with the USA) are from the National
Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics of Mexico
(INEGI) economic information data bank at http://
dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe. National
savings and investment rates are from the statistical appendix




 The series excluding privatization revenues were not fully
available in IFS but since mid-1999.
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